Over the last three decades, the rise of embodied cognition (EC) articulated in various schools (or versions) of embodied, embedded, extended and enacted cognition (Gallagher’s 4E) has offered AI a way out of traditional computationalism—an approach (or an understanding) loosely referred to as embodied AI.This view has split into various branches ranging from a weak form on the brink of functionalism (loosely represented by Clarks’ parity principle) to a strong form (often corresponding to autopoietic-friendly enactivism) suggesting Ointment that body−world interactions constitute cognition.From an ontological perspective, however, constitution is a problematic notion with no obvious empirical or technical advantages.This paper discusses the ontological issues of these two approaches in regard to embodied AI and its ontological Black Series Helmets commitments: circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism.
The paper also outlines an even more radical approach that may offer some ontological advantages.The new approach, called the mind-object identity, is then briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and with the embodied identity theory.